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REFUGEES, THE RULE OF LAW AND
EXECUTIVE POWER: A(NOTHER) CASE OF THE
CONJUROR'S RABBIT?
Dr Peter Billings, Principal Lecturer in Law, Human Rights Unit,
University of the West of England*
"The whole topic of Crown prerogatives is veiled in a mist of
doctrinal and historical obscurity, and the existence or scope of
many prerogatives is not always easily determined."'
INTRODUCTION
In Ruddock v Vadarlis2 the Federal Court of Australia was asked to
determine several complex legal and constitutional questions. One question
addressed by the court was the legality of the Australian Government's
decision to deport3 putative refugees from its territorial waters around
Christmas Island before any consideration of their asylum claims.4
Specifically, the court had to examine, inter alia, important questions about
executive power' and its relationship to statute. The majority of the court
determined that the executive had, and retained, the power to deport asylum
seekers sailing aboard a Norwegian container ship (the MV Tampa) towards
Christmas island. The court decided that the executive power was not
abrogated or abridged by a statutory regime (Migration Act 1958)6 that
provided for the comprehensive regulation of entry into Australia by non-
nationals.
The author gratefully acknowledges Barry Berkan, Richard Clements, Professor
Gabrielle Ganz, Jane Kay, and Dr Ben Pontin for their helpful comments. In
particular, I am indebted to Associate Professor Susan Kneebone for her
observations on an earlier draft. The usual disclaimer applies.
Edeson, "The Prerogative of the Crown to Delimit Britain's Maritime Boundary"
[1973] PL 364.
2 (2001) 66 A.L.D. 25. The High Court refused to entertain an appeal against the
decision of the Federal Court (Vadarlis v M1mA M93/2001 <www.austlii.edu.au
/au/other/hca/transcripts/2001/M93/3.htnl> (accessed 3 July 2003). See Head,
"The High Court and the Tampa Refugees" (2002) 11 (1) Griffith LR 23.
The terms deportation and expulsion are synonymous; expulsion is part of the
vocabulary of international law, deportation is used in the domestic context. Since
the Tampa refugees were in Australian territory and this analysis is concerned with
prerogative powers I shall employ the former term. By contrast, exclusion
encapsulates situations of non-admission at the border. Although the Australian
government did not wish to admit the Tampa refugees they were within Australian
territory.
The case is, therefore, distinguishable from the policy of interdiction on the high
seas (in relation to Haitian asylum seekers) which was upheld by the US Supreme
Court in Sale v Haitian Centers Council 113 Sup Ct 2549.
6 See infra note 15 and associated text for details.
As amended (see Border Protection Legislation Amendment Act 1999 in the
context of this case).
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The case is located in the interstices of domestic law, human rights treaties,
customary international law and sovereign rights. This analysis is primarily
concerned with domestic (public) law although international law is also
highly relevant to the discussion. The decision in Ruddock v Vadarlis raises
questions of constitutional importance7 about the precise legal relationship
between statute and prerogative powers, the balance of power between
executive and Parliament, and the rule of law. First, how far did the
unwritten powers of the Crown extend, historically, and did the residual
prerogative power claimed actually exist any longer? Secondly, where
statute and prerogative powers appear to regulate the same area, which
source can be relied upon to validate the exercise of public power? Bound
up with both of these questions is the issue of whether 'state necessity' is a
relevant, or determining factor in such judicial analyses.
The first problem, namely, whether the power to authorise the asylum
seekers' deportation (and detention to that end) actually existed, is the type
of task the courts have undertaken for several centuries.8 The second
problem, of theoretical and practical importance, is also not new to judges,
scholars and law students; feted cases include De Keyser's Royal Hotel' and
ex parte Fire Brigades Union," and Markesims provided a rigorous analysis
thirty years ago." The present author's concern is to critically address those
aspects of the decision in Ruddock that analyse the difficult question of
precisely when a prerogative power is abrogated or abridged by statute - by
implication. This question is far from "trite". 2 Indeed, as Markesinis noted,
where the prerogative is not explicitly referred to in the statute, in terms of it
being either abolished, restricted, preserved (but subject to regulation in the
Act'3) or wholly unaffected, the relationship remains "strangely abstruse".' 4
7 For a critical examination of the implications of the case for domestic refugee law
and practice in Australia, see Mathew, "Australian Refugee Protection In The
Wake Of The Tampa" [2002] 96 AIIL 661. For an analysis of Australia's
obligations under international law and customary international law, see Bostock,
"The International Legal Obligations owed to the Asylum Seekers on the MV
Tampa" (2002) 14(2/3) IJRL 279. For an alternative view see Blay, "The case of
MV Tampa: state and refugee rights collide at sea" (2002) 76 ALJ 12. For an
analysis of the refugee law, maritime law and domestic law implications see
Willheim, "MV Tampa: The Australian Response" (2003) 15(2) IJRL 159.
8 In fulfilling this task the courts have attracted criticism for some of their decisions.
For example, see Edeson, supra n I and Bradley, "Police Powers and the
Prerogative" [19881 PL 298.
9 Attorney-General vDe Keyser's Royal HotelLtd [1920] A.C. 508.
10 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Fire Brigades Union
[1995] 2 A.C. 513. See also, R (Mahmood and another) v Royal Pharmaceutical
Society of Great Britain [2002] 1 W.L.R. 879.
Markesinis, "The Royal Prerogative Revisited" [1973] 32(2) CLJ 287.
12 Per Lord Bridge in Co Williams Construction Ltd v Blackman [1995] 1 W.L.R.
102, at 108.
13 For example, the Imigration Act 1971 s 33(5) provides: "This Act shall not be
taken to supercede or impair any power exercisable by Her Majesty in relation to
aliens by virtue of Her Prerogative."
'4 Markesinis, supra n 11, at 299.
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The Facts
At the behest of the Australian government, the MV Tampa, a Norwegian
registered container ship, rescued 433 asylum seekers from a sinking fishing
boat in the Indian Ocean on 26 August 2001. When the captain of the vessel
changed course and headed for Christmas Island with the rescuees aboard the
Australian government refused to permit the MV Tampa from entering
Australian waters and asked her to head toward Indonesia. However, the MV
Tampa entered Australian waters on 29 August, because the ship's captain
was concerned about the potential loss of life given the condition of his
passengers and the risk of travelling across open waters to Indonesia. In
response the Australian Defence Force interdicted the vessel and boarded
her. The asylum seekers were transferred to HMAS Manoora around 3
September. Legal proceedings began on behalf of the asylum seekers on 31
August. Mr Vadarlis (a solicitor) and the Victorian Council for Civil
Liberties sought a restraining injunction, on the basis that, inter alia, the
executive had no lawful authority to expel the rescuees from Australian
waters.
During the course of the final hearing of the applications, which commenced
on 2 September, the parties agreed that the asylum seekers aboard the HMAS
Manoora could be taken to Nauru and New Zealand for initial processing.
These arrangements were subsequently, referred to as 'The Pacific Solution'.
The Statutory Framework
Executive power is contained in Commonwealth of Australia Constitution
Act 1900 section 61.5 This section "confers on the Commonwealth all the
prerogative powers of the Crown except those that are necessarily
exercisable by the States under the allocation of responsibilities made by the
Constitution and those denied by the Constitution itself."6 Thus, prerogative
powers are the historical antecedents of the 'executive' power provided for in
section 61 of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900.17 The
long title of the Migration Act 1958 provides: "an Act relating to the entry
into, and presence in, Australia of aliens, and the departure or deportation
from Australia of aliens and certain other persons." Section 4(1) reads: "...
the object of this Act is to regulate, in the national interest, the coming into,
and presence in, Australia of non-citizens." Section 6 established that the
Migration Act was to apply to those persons in Australia but outside the
migration zone (as the Tampa refugees were). Other key provisions were
sections 189(2), 245F(9) and 256. Section 189(2) provided for the detention
of unlawful non-citizens who were outside the migration zone. Section
245F(9)18 expanded Australia's ability to board, search and detain ships, and
detain those aboard at sea. Section 256 was relevant because it provided that
5 S 61 provides: "The executive power of the Commonwealth is vested in the
Queen, and is exercisable by the Governor-General as the Queen's representative,
and extends to the execution and maintenance of this Constitution, and of the laws
of the Commonwealth."
16 Davis v Commonwealth (1988) 16 C.L.R. 79, at 93.
17 See generally, Barton v Commonwealth (1974) 131 C.L.R. 477, at 498 and Davis
v Commonwealth (1988) 166 C.L.R. 79, at 93-93, 107-108.18 Amendment added via the Border Control Protection Act 1999.
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those in detention under the Migration Act could have access to certain
facilities at their request, such as legal advice and visa application forms. 9
Australia's protection obligations under the Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees 1951 (Geneva Convention) and its Protocol 1967,20 are
referred to in section 36(2) of the Migration Act.21 There is a right to seek
asylum under international law, but no correlative duty to admit asylum
seekers incumbent upon states. 2  However, Article 33 (the non-refoulement
norm) of the Geneva Convention precludes states from returning asylum
seekers to a place where their life or freedom would be threatened; by reason
of their race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or
political opinion. Furthermore, Article 31 provides that asylum seekers are
not to be penalised for arriving illegally. It applies where they have come
directly from the place where they were persecuted, present themselves
without delay to the authorities and show good cause for their illegal entry or
presence.
The Judgments
On 11 September, in the Federal Court, North J, held that there was no
relevant executive power that could authorise the deportation of the asylum
seekers and ordered their return to Australia for processing. Two days later
the full Federal Court heard an appeal by the government 23 The majority
(Black C.J. dissenting) overturned the determination of North J., deciding
that the steps taken in relation to the asylum seekers to prevent them lodging
asylum claims in Australia were within the scope of executive power, and
therefore lawful.
The Majority
First, French J. opined that there was no place "for any doctrine that a law
made on a particular subject matter is presumed to displace or regulate the
operation of the executive power."24 It was a matter of construction. As a
prelude to this conclusion, the judge drew a distinction between prerogative
19 The Australian government did not invoke these provisions to detain the MV
Tampa and those aboard precisely because it did not want the refugees to avail
themselves of the procedural guarantees contained within the Migration Act.
20 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 189 U.N.T.S. 150; and United
Nations Protocol 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees 606 U.N.T.S.
267.
21 "(2) A criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant is a non-citizen in
Australia to whom Australia has protection obligations under the Refugee
Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol." The refugee definition was
implemented in domestic law by the Migration Amendment Act (No 2) 1980.
22 Art 14(1) of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides that:
"Everyone has the right to seek and enjoy in other countries asylum from
persecution." U.N.G.A. resolution 217 A(III).
23 The hearing dates are potentially significant, coinciding with the terrorist attacks
in the USA. Mathew notes: "One can only speculate about the different light in
which the division between legislative and executive powers may have appeared
to particular judges depending on whether the court sat before or after September
11." (Mathew, supra n 7, at 662).24 (2001) 66 A.L.D. 25, 70 [183].
416 Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly [Vol. 54, No. 4]
and executive powers, notwithstanding their common historical origins. The
executive power of the Commonwealth under section 61 could not be treated
as a species of the royal prerogative. Section 61 was conferred as part of a
negotiated federal compact expressed in a written Constitution distributing
power between the three arms of government, he observed." This seems a
rather novel and unconvincing attempt to make a conceptual distinction
between prerogative and executive powers.26 This cannot mean that the
Executive can claim, or the courts recognise and enforce, new or broader
powers based on the prerogative. This would undermine the fundamental
principle that: "[Ilt is 350 years and a civil war too late for the Queen's
courts to broaden the prerogative."27 Moreover, in Australian Communist
Party v Commonwealth, Williams J. considered that: "the executive power of
the Commonwealth at the date of the Constitution presumably included such
of the then existing prerogative powers of the King in England as were
applicable to a body politic of limited powers."28
The inference here is that before Australia became a sovereign state only
some prerogative powers could be exercised by the Governor General (on the
advice of the Executive) or the States' Governors. Consequently, after
independence, although Australia was no longer a limited political body,
only those prerogative powers that were in existence at the date the
Constitution, could be utilised, not more. Thus, French J. must have meant
that executive power under section 61 has a life of its own as an indigenous
concept distinct from prerogative powers.
In construing the operation of statute upon executive power, French J.
reasoned that close scrutiny of the statute was merited where its purported
effect was to displace an executive power "intimately connected to
Australia's status as a sovereign nation-state".29 The greater the significance
of the particular executive power the less likely it was that parliament would
extinguish it, absent express wording or inescapable implication.3" The
importance of the executive power to national sovereignty was a recurring
theme in French J's judgment.3
Secondly, in reliance on precedents over a century old,32 French J. underlined
the right of a state to exclude or expel aliens under international law.33 He
distinguished those precedents from two other expulsion cases involving
Chinese immigrants34 because the executive power claimed in those two
cases was contrary to a statute, under which there was at least implied
25 Ibid.
26 There is of course a difference between personal prerogative powers of the
Monarch (or their delegate, such as the Governor General in Australia) to dissolve
the legislature for example, and executive powers such as signing a treaty.
27 BBC v Johns [1965] Ch 32, at 79.
28 (1951)83 C.L.R. 1, at230.
(2001) 66 A.L.D. 25, 71 [185].
30 Ibid.
31 Infra note 38 and associated text.
32 ReAdam [1837] 1 Moo P.C., 12 E.R. 889;Musgrove v Toy [1891] A.C. 272.
3 The relevance of the supreme power inherent in states to refuse entry to non-
nationals is explored subsequently, see infra at note 49 and associated text.
34 Exparte LoPak (1888) 9 N.S.W.R. 221; Exparte Leong Kum (1888) 9 N.S.W.R.
254.
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permission to enter the colony.35 Moreover, the judge attached importance to
the fact that these (apparently contradictory) cases were determined when
Australia was a colony and not a sovereign state. He contended: "The scope
of the executive power conferred by section 61 of the Constitution is to be
measured by reference to Australia's status as a sovereign nation."36 It is one
thing to acknowledge that the scope of executive power was limited when
Australia was a colony. However, quite another to intimate that
subsequently, the content of executive power is wider than the content of the
Crown's prerogative powers extant at the time of the Constitution from
which executive power ostensibly derived. In short, it cannot be correct that
the court permitted the Australian Government to exercise executive powers
that are 'wider' than the prerogative powers of the Crown from which they
derive conceptually. It is also relevant, though not determinative, that those
powers had not been exercised for at least a century.37 Common law
prerogative powers provided neither a concrete historical basis, nor
contemporary legal basis, for the claimed power.
Nevertheless, French J. opined that the Constitution provided sufficiently
wide powers to authorise the executive action under review:
"The power to determine who may come into Australia is so
central to its sovereignty that it is not to be supposed that the
government of the nation would lack the power conferred upon
it directly by the Constitution, the ability to prevent people not
part of the Australian community, from entering." 8
Thus, the judge stressed the importance of those executive powers intimately
connected to Australia's status as an independent, sovereign, nation-state.
Lane refers to 'sheer' executive acts, deriving from "the character and status
of the Commonwealth as a national government" and cites as an example
"the protection of the constitution and constitutional government [. ..
against terrorist activities."39 However, it is difficult to conceive of the threat
to constitutional government in this case, thereby justifying the use of such
"will-o'-the-wisp" 40 powers against putative refugees. Furthermore, by
observing that section 61 "like the power to make laws with respect to
defence, [it] will vary according to circumstances", 4' the judge's dicta has a
familiar ring to it. In R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex
parte Northumbria Police Authority, surprisingly, a case not referred to in
any of the judgments, the Court of Appeal recognised the existence of a
prerogative of keeping the peace of the realm. In the, infamous, words of
Nourse L.J:
3 (2001) 66 A.LD. 25, 73 [190].
36 Ibid at 73 [191].
37 Indeed, French J. acknowledged the comments of Barton J. in Robtelmes v Brenan
(1906) 4 C.L.R. 395, at 414; the Encyclopedia of the Laws of England, vol 5 at
p 298 provided that although the Crown could use its prerogative to expel aliens it
had not attempted to do so since the Glorious Revolution (ibid at 74 [194]).
38 Ibid at 173 [194].
39 Lane, Lane's Commentary on the Australian Constitution (LBC Information
Services 1997) at 130-131, 438-439.
40 Ibid at 131.
41 (2001) 66 A.L.D. 25, 74 [197].
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"There is no historical or other basis for denying to the war
prerogative a sister prerogative of keeping the peace within the
realm. . . [t]he scarcity of references in the books to the
prerogative of keeping the peace within the realm does not
disprove that it exists. Rather, it may point to an unspoken
assumption that it does."42
This decision has been roundly criticised, by Bradley, who argued that the
judges, by recognising the existence in law of a hitherto uncertain power of
the Crown, actually increased uncertainty in the law; specifically, concerning
the relationship between the power and legislation and its capacity to
authorise new forms of executive action. Referring to Entick v Carrington,
he reasoned that
"the thrust of Entick is that the English courts should take a
hard look at assertions of prerogative power and, even where a
claim of state necessity is argued, refrain from providing new
precedents accepting such claims."43
French J. decided that the executive power claimed by the government was
implicit in section 61 and its scope was wide enough to encompass the
interdiction of the Tampa." Furthermore, given its centrality to notions of
state sovereignty, the courts should construe legislation covering the same
area narrowly. Therefore, he concluded that the Migration Act did not
abrogate the executive power. The statute did not contain express words to
that effect, nor did it, as a matter of construction, evince a clear and
unambiguous intention to do so.
45
Beaumont J. agreed with the reasoning of French J., and added some further
reasons of his own:
"In my opinion, the primary judge should have inquired
whether at common law [ . . there was a legal right in the
occupants to enter Australia. If his Honour had asked this
question, it would, in accordance with the settled course of
authority, have been answered in the negative. '46
Beaumont J. surveyed relevant authorities beginning with Musgrove v Toy,4"
where the Privy Council held that, apart from statute, an alien had no legal
42 [1988] 1 All E.R. 556, at 575, and per Purchas L.J at 566. Infamous, because it
contrasts sharply with Lord Camden's words in Entick v Carrington (1765) 19 St.
Tr. 1030, 1067, 1073.
43 Bradley, supra n 8, at 301.
44 Contrast this with Lim v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic
Affairs (1992) 176 C.L.R. 1, where the High Court made it clear that
administrative detention of asylum seekers arriving by boat required specific
statutory authorisation: "any officer of the Commonwealth Executive who
purports to authorize or enforce the detention in custody of such an alien without
judicial mandate will be acting lawfully only to the extent that his or her conduct
is justified by valid statutory provision." (at 19).
4 (2001) 66 A.L.D. 25, 75 [201].
46 (2001) 66 ALD 25, 52 [111 ].
'7 [1891] A.C. 272. Approved in Johnstone v Pedlar [1921] 2 A.C. 262 and R v
Carter exparte Kisch (1934) 52 C.L.R. 221.
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right enforceable by action to enter Victoria.4 He continued with reference
to Attorney-General (Canada) v Cain, where Lord Atkinson, following
Musgrove, observed, "[o]ne of the rights possessed by the supreme power in
every State is the right to refuse to permit an alien to enter that State. '49
After citing several similar authorities," he allowed the appeal by simply
concluding that aliens had no right to enter Australia. Thornberry has
criticised the decision in Musgrove v Toy owing to the absence of any
authority advanced in support of the proposition that an alien has no right of
entry, and the lack of any principled discussion.5 Moreover, in respect of
the decision in Attorney-General (Canada) v Cain, he opined that "the
prerogative of expulsion was produced by the Privy Council rather as a
conjuror produces a rabbit. It was simply assumed that the Crown possessed
the right."52
Moreover, the cases relied on by Beaumont and French JJ refer to the power
possessed by states under international law. Yet as French J. recognised, the,
"way in which the right to expel or to refuse entry is exercised, and whether
by legislative or executive means, may vary according to the constitutional
mechanisms of particular states."5" Thus, the manner in which this
international law principle was given further effect should have entailed an
examination of municipal law. Consideration of the relationship between the
Migration Act and executive power was a vital undertaking. Accordingly,
with respect, Beaumont J's approach to the inquiry was wrong. There is a
critical difference between the supreme power in every state to regulate the
entry of aliens under international law and prerogative powers at common
law. The vexing question of whether there was, and remained, a common
law prerogative right to deport non-nationals was the correct inquiry for the
court to pursue. But "the Crown can have no prerogative by the law of
nations".' What may be permissible under international law55 has no bearing
on the existence of any constitutional power.
It is paradoxical that both judges were content to employ this international
law maxim whilst affording Australia's international law obligations to
refugees a cursory inspection. French J. concluded that "nothing done by the
18 Ibid at 282, obiter dicta of the Lord Chancellor, in terms reminiscent of the 'act of
State' doctrine.
49 [1906] A.C. 542, at 546. It was not clear whether the references to the supreme
power of each state to refuse to admit a non-national were intended to be
references to the prerogative at all.
50 Ah Yin v Christie (1907) 4 C.L.R. 1428, 13 A.L.R. 372; Udny v Udny (1869) L.R.
I Sc. & Div. 441.
5' Thomberry, "Dr Soblen and the Alien Law of the UK" (1963) 12 ICLQ 414, at
424.
52 Ibid, at 425.
13 (2001)66A.L.D. 25, 72 [186].
5 Craies, "The Right of Aliens to Enter British Territory" (1890) 6 LQR 27, 36.
55 There appears to be a consensus among scholars and judiciary that a state may
exclude non-nationals under international law. However, see Nafziger, "The
General Admission of Aliens Under International Law" [1983] 77 AJIL 804, for
an illuminating critique of this proposition. The author demonstrates how the early
authorities, cited in modem cases such as Ruddock, to support the exclusionary
proposition, were based on a selective reading of the work of Vattel, Pufendorf
and others.
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executive on the face of it amounts to a breach of Australia's obligations in
respect of non-refoulement under the Refugee Convention."56 Meanwhile,
Beaumont J, in a postscript, urged any extra-judicial assessment of executive
policy in this case to be undertaken bearing in mind the obligations
incumbent on states under Article 33 of the Refugee Convention. Namely, in
his view, that there was no obligation under international law to resettle those
rescued in a state's territory.5" This perfunctory examination of the
importance and relevance of international norms has been criticised by
another member of the judiciary and laid bare by academics. 8
The Dissentient
Black C.J., expressed doubt as to the continuing existence of the claimed
prerogative. He pointed to judicial and extra-judicial observations that
supported the proposition that prerogative powers could fall into disuse and,
consequently, be considered extinguished because they had become
incompatible with modem constitutional jurisprudence. 9 His historical
survey of the jurisprudence and academic commentary led to the conclusion
that, "by the end of the nineteenth century, in English jurisprudence, the
power to exclude aliens in times of peace was not considered to be part of the
prerogative."6 It was "at best, doubtful that the asserted prerogative power
continues to exist at common law: [... I its existence is entirely uncertain,
and there are no previous modem instances of its exercise."'" Hence,
although it may have been propitious for the Australian government to
resuscitate an ancient prerogative power, by doing so they were breathing
new life into a prerogative that had long since expired.62
Haycraft's historical analysis led him to conclude that it appeared that the
Crown did possess a prerogative right to exclude and expel foreigners.63
However, there was a strong parallel current of opinion in the opposite
direction. In terms that ring true over a century later, he opined:
"[Ilt is hardly conceivable that a government would desire to
use for such a purpose powers which have fallen out of
common use, until the whole question has been discussed in
Parliament, and it is known what exercise of powers, if any,
Parliament considers necessary for the protection of our
common interests. 64
56 Ibid, at 76 [203]. See Blay, supra n 7, at 17 for a concurring opinion. Contrast this
with the analysis by Mathew, supra n 7, at 665-667.
57 (2001) 66 A.L.D. 25, 54 [126].58 See Nicholson C. whose lecture was quoted in "Current Issues" (2002) 76 ALl
405; and Mathew, supra n 7, at 665-667.
61 (2001) 66 A.L.D. 25, 31 [20].60 Per Black C.J., at 32 [26].
61 Ibid, at 33 [29].
62 A view supported by several academic authorities, see Craies supra n 54, at 29;Thornberry supra n 51 at 424; and Goodwin-Gill, "The Limits of the Power of
Expulsion in Public International Law" (1976) 55 BYIL 106-7.
63 Haycraft, "Alien Legislation and the Prerogative of the Crown" (1897) 13 LQR
165.
64 Ibid at 185.
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Yet, "a vanishing prerogative is a strange creature, for there is no generally
accepted principle of law that a prerogative may be lost by deseutude."65
However, although a common law rule, once clearly established does not
become extinct merely by disuse, it remains capable of recrudescence in
propitious circumstances only when it would not be grossly anomalous and
anachronistic (author's emphasis).66 Evidently the common law rule
permitting the Australian Government to deport asylum seekers was not
clearly established (as Beaumont J. contended) and reviving it in 2001 was
grossly anomalous and anachronistic.
Proceeding on the basis that the existence of a common law power to exclude
aliens in peacetime was, at best, 'doubtful', Black C.J. examined the scope of
section 61 to determine if it was wider than its prerogative antecedent:
"It would be a very strange circumstance if the at best doubtful
and historically long-unused power to exclude or expel should
emerge in a strong modem form from s 61 of the Constitution
by virtue of general conceptions of the "national interest" This
is all the more so when according to English constitutional
theory new prerogative powers cannot be created '" '67
But assuming there was such a prerogative power, was it abrogated by the
Migration Act 1958?
Black C.J. was content to rely upon De Keyser's and Laker Airways Ltd v
Department of Trade,68 to support the following proposition - that "where the
prerogative is relied on as an alternative source of power to action under a
statute, the prerogative will be held to be displaced when the statute covers
the subject matter."69 He then examined the question of the clarity with
which an intention to displace a prerogative or executive power needs to be
expressed:
"It can readily be conceded that if a power is well-used, well
established and important to the functioning of executive
government, a very clear manifestation of an intention to
abrogate will be required, But, similarly, where an asserted
power is at best doubtful, and where, if it exists at all, it does
so in a field that has been the concern of parliament for a very
long time, a less stringent view of the intention necessary to
abrogate such a power is appropriate. Another such indication
may be where the parliament has entered a field in which
Australia has assumed treaty obligations and has acted to give
effect to those obligations in that field and where the asserted
prerogative or executive power might be capable of exercise in
65 De Smith and Brazier, Constitutional and Administrative Law (Penguin, 1998), at
136. InRe F (MentalPatient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 A.C. I at 26, Neill L.J. stated,
"It seems to me that it would require clear statutory words to remove from the
Crown a prerogative power which has vested in the Crown since at least 1325-"
6 McKendrick v Sinclair [1972] SL.T. 110, at 116 per Simon L.J..67 (2001)66 A.L.D. 25, at 33 [30].
68 [1920] AC 508; [1977] 1 Q.B. 643.
69 (2001) 66 A.L.D. 25, at 35 [37].
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a manner not conformable with the parliament's provision for
the satisfaction of those obligations."70
In support of his view that any residual discretion was abridged, the judge
referred to the long title of the Migration Act 1958 and section 4(1). The
latter provides that ". . the object of this Act is to regulate, in the national
interest, the coming into, and presence in, Australia of non-citizens."71
Moreover, the Act refers to Australia's protection obligations under the 1951
Geneva Convention.72 Black C.J. seized on the reference to the "national
interest" in section 4(1) as "suggestive of a recognition by the parliament of
its unquestioned power to determine comprehensively what the national
interest shall be in this respect."73 Further, the "national interest" includes
recognition of obligations under the Geneva Convention. In conjunction
with the provisions in the Border Protection Legislation Amendment Act
1999, the Migration Act provided a comprehensive regime for the control of
Australia's borders and the patrol of the territorial waters. That statutory
regime covered circumstances such as those affecting the asylum seekers at
the relevant time. The judge was plainly of the view that the power claimed
by the Executive was excluded, by implication, because the legislation
evinced a very clear intention to cover the field in question exhaustively.74
The uncertain nature of the power asserted on behalf of the executive
fortified this view. The regime could have applied to the rescued people had
the government "not taken a view" that it did not wish to apply the Act.75
The judge's analysis of precisely when a statute displaces a prerogative or
executive power is worthy of closer inspection. First, he agreed with French
J. that the importance of the power to the functioning of executive
government was a relevant factor when determining the relationship between
statute and prerogative. However, he added that the power must also be
well-used and well established. Second, he considered it relevant that the
field had been the concern of Parliament for a very long time. Third, he
opined that weight should be attached to Australia's obligations under
international law, although they were not incorporated into Australian law.
The use of international law to inform the development of common law vis-
6t-vis the relationship between statute and prerogative (executive) powers
merits further evaluation.
The status of the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
and its 1967 Protocol in domestic law is "tenuous". 76 The Migration Act
70 Ibid, at 36 [40].
7! The wide scope of the Act was confirmed by the Immigration and Multicultural
Affairs Minister, Philip Ruddock, during the second reading (House of
Representatives, Parliamentary Debates, Hansard 22 September 1999, at 10147)(cited by Black C.J. at 40 [62]). Furthermore, there is no provision analogous to s
33(5) Immigration Act 1971 that expressly preserves the residue of discretionary
authority.
72 In much the same way that the UK's protection obligations arising under the 1951
Convention are alluded to in s 1 1996 Asylum and Immigration Act.
7 (2001) 66 A.L.D. 25, 37 [44].
74 See de Smith, and Brazier, supra n 65, at 13940.
71 (2001) 66 A.L.D. 25, 39 [60].
76 Mathew, "Human Rights" in Blays, Piotrowicz, and Tsamenyi (eds), Public
International Law: An Australian Perspective (O.U.P, 1997), at 291.
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1958 simply refers to persons to whom Australia has protection obligations
under the Convention and sets out the procedures for the examination and
determination of asylum claims. Individuals cannot invoke rights contained
in either the 1951 Convention or 1967 Protocol in domestic proceedings.
Nor are obligations arising thereunder, absent transformation into domestic
law, binding on the government.77 However, the High Court especially has
used, in particular, human rights treaties as a tool of interpretation in respect
of statutes and as a "legitimate and important influence on the development
of the common law."'" Such an approach "is one appropriate to the times in
which we live"79 preferable to referring to analogous decisions "written often
in a different world for different social conditions".8" Indeed, as Nafziger has
concluded, the key Anglo-American cases8 decided at the turn of the
twentieth century, were premised on an acceptance of nativism and racial
prejudice.82 Furthermore, recent Canadian jurisprudence supports such a
methodology:
"Since the Case of Proclamations and the Glorious Revolution
the Executive's exercise of power, including it's use of the
Prerogative, has been subject to the Rule of Law. It would
shock the conscience today if the Executive could rely upon
the Prerogative to justify actions or omissions that were illegal
or contrary to our international commitments. [. . .] I am well
aware that International law and international commitments
cannot found a cause of action under domestic law unless they
have been written into domestic law. I am also aware that, by
Statute, Parliament may legalize that which might otherwise be
illegal under international law or contrary to our international
commitments. [... .1 International law and our international
commitments are the metwand against which the legitimacy of
the purported use of the Prerogative might be measured by the
court." 83
Hence Black C.J.'s approach to the construction of statute and prerogative
powers appears defensible. There is no logical reason why an analysis of
statutory provisions, as a source of public power, can involve recourse to
international treaties but an analysis of the nature of prerogative powers
cannot. Similarly, the source of public powers has been discarded by the
courts as a controlling factor vis-li-vis amenability to judicial review for
some time.84
7 Simsek vMacPhee (1982) 148 C.L.R. 636, at 641-2.
78 Mabo v The State of Queensland (No.2) (1992) 175 C.L.R. 1, at 42.
79 Kirby, "The Role of International Standards in Australian Courts" in Alston and
Chiam, Treaty Making and Australia (Federation Press, 1995), at 92.
80 Ibid, at 86.
81 Such as Musgrove v Toy [1891] AC 272; The Chinese Exclusion Case 130 U.S.
581 (1889).
82 Nafziger, supra n 55, at 824.
83 Per Wright J. in Aleksic v Canada (Attorney General) [2002] A.CWS.J 4507;
115 A.C.W.S. (3d) 252, at para 11-14.
8 Council for the Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] A.C.
374, 407 (per Lord Scarman ).
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The existence of a common law right to deport and exclude aliens has curried
judicial favour.85 However, in Schmidt v Secretary of State for Home
Department, Lord Denning observed: "The common law has now been
overtaken by the Aliens Acts and the Orders thereunder."86 The implication
is, ostensibly, that the prerogative power was in a state of abeyance. This
analysis received endorsement in R v 1AT ex parte Secretary of State for the
Home Department.87 Stuart-Smith LJ opined that: "The Act as a whole
abrogates the prerogative power, save to the limited extent provided [by s.
33(5)]. "88 Jackson has argued that although read literally section 33(5)
"could be used to bypass both Act and immigration rules in respect of aliens
* . .it seems to have been common ground that the effect of the statutory
provision was to make actions taken other than under the rules the exercise
of the prerogative. 8' Thus, prerogative powers expressly preserved in the
1971 Act were not to be relied on to circumvent the comprehensive
legislative scheme. Those powers were only to provide a lawful basis for the
(favourable) exercise of discretion outside of the legislative scheme; to
supplement and not supplant the Act. The 1958 Migration Act contained no
such 'saving' provision at the time of the Tampa incident, only
retrospectively, via an amendment.90
CONCLUSIONS
(1) The existence and scope of the power claimed
The Australian government claimed an uncertain prerogative-based power
because it was highly convenient for them to do so. It meant they could
circumvent the procedural safeguards that the asylum seekers were entitled
to under the terms of the Migration Act 1958 and prevent them lodging
claims for refugee status. The Federal Court (and High Court) permitted
political expediency to trump legal certainty and procedural fairness, thereby
undermining the protection of refugees rooted in international law.9 The
weight of academic authority conflicts with the conclusion reached by the
majority in the Federal Court, regarding the existence and scope of the power
asserted at common law. Judicial opinions proved, at best, inconclusive on
the matter. The interpretation placed upon section 61 of the Constitution by
French J. was unsupported. It is striking that the Australian Parliament
deemed it necessary to pass the Border Protection (Validation and
Enforcement Powers) Act on 26 September 2001 to validate the action taken
against the refugees aboard the MV Tampa retrospectively.92
85 Schmidt v Secretary of State for Home Department [1969] 2 Ch. 149, at 168, 172.
This view was affirmed in R v Governor of Pentonville Prison ex parte Azam
[1973] 2 W.L.R. 949, at 960.86 Ibid, at 168.
87 [1990] 3 All E.R. 652, at 661.
88 Ibid, at 657. See also R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte
Samya and ors [1989] 1mm. A.R. 75, at 82.89 Jackson, Immigration Law and Practice (Sweet and Maxwell, 1999), at 723.
90 Border Protection (Validation and Enforcement Powers) Act 2001.
91 See generally Mathew, "Australian Refugee Protection in the Wake of the Tampa"
supra n 7.92 S 7A confirms the power claimed by the executive to act outside of the statutory
framework: "The existence of statutory powers under this Act does not prevent the
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(2) The relationship between statute and prerogative
It is hoped that the navigational aids referred to by Black C.J. will be adopted
in suitable cases in the future, where judges are required to address the
puzzling relationship between statute and prerogative. To reiterate: when
determining whether prerogative powers have been displaced by statute, by
implication, the following factors are relevant: (1) The importance of the
power claimed to the functioning of executive government, but with the
caveat that the power must be clearly established and well-used; (2) Whether
the area of law had been the preserve of Parliament for a very long time; and
(3) International legal obligations (where relevant) carry some weight One
must view the imprecision in some of these terms in the light of the hazy
subject matter they seek to direct. The terms do not determine the precise
course judges should steer, rather, they are indicators that will see them
heading in the right direction.
(3) Legal limbo
In Tv United Kingdom Lord Mustill stated:
"Neither under international nor English municipal law does a
fugitive have any direct right to insist on being received by a
country of refuge. [ . I The [domestic] legislation must be
viewed against the background of a complete absence of any
common law right, either national or international, for a
refugee to insist on being admitted to a foreign country." 93
Herein lies the rub. The asylum seekers aboard the MT Tampa existed in a
legal twilight zone. They had no common law right to enter, but, equally. the
Australian Government had no lawful means to deport them given the
statutory framework extant at the time the Tampa was in its territorial waters.
Dauvergne has opined that the absence of a right to enter a state under
international law is vital. "While states would breach the Convention by
expelling refugees to places where they would be in danger, they are acting
well within their 'rights' when they force boats carrying potential refugees
away from their shores."94 Insofar as interdiction beyond territorial waters is
concerned, the author's view has received judicial endorsement in European
Roma Rights Centre v Immigration Officer at Prague Airport.95 The farther
exercise of any executive power of the Commonwealth to protect Australia's
borders.. .". Thus, it is comparable to s 33(5) of the 1971 Immigration Act For a
critical analysis of the changes made to asylum law in the aftermath of the Tampa
incident, see Mathew, ibid, Crock, and Saul, Future Seekers: Refugees and the
Law in Australia (Federation Press, 2002), at chap 7, and Edwards, "Tampering
with Refugee Protection: The Case of Australia" (2003) 15(2) IJRL 192.
9' [1996] A.C. 742, at 754, 758.
94 Dauvergne, "The Dilemma of Rights Discourse for Refugees" (2000) 23(2)
UNSWLI 56, 60.
9' [20031 E.W.C.A. Civ 666. The legality of immigration rules applied extra-
territorially were questioned, but the court held they were not in violation of the
UK's obligations under Art 33. Nor could Art 33 be interpreted to afford putative
refugees a right of access to another country. The decision parallels Sale v
Haitian Centers Council except the court drew a line between preventing the
arrval of asylum seekers (lawful) and returning them to their own country
(unlawful) (at [43]).
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away asylum seekers are from surrogate states, the less likely it is that
international law will bite. However, where expulsion from territorial waters
is concerned the matter is, or ought to have been, transformed. Where,
through legislation, states have freely undertaken to respect international
legal obligations, their freedom to act can be fettered by the terms of that
legislation.96 That is, as long as those international obligations remain
enshrined (if not incorporated) in the national legal system. Ultimately,
Dauvergne's analysis is correct. A state may take the political decision to
undermine or renege upon its international treaty obligations and amend or
repeal municipal law accordingly.
(4) Threat to democracy and refugee protection
In 1893 Brewer J, in Fong Yue Ting v US, warned, "The doctrine of powers
inherent in sovereignty is one both indefinite and dangerous...".97 Bradley
cautioned against the dangers of judicial recognition of a hitherto uncertain
power after the ex parte Northumbria Police Authority judgment. Again, in
Ruddock axiomatic principles that underpin all liberal constitutions, the rule
of law and separation of powers, appear overlooked. Not only is legal
certainty compromised, the recognition of the power claimed by the
Executive bucks the trend of subjecting prerogative powers to the will of the
democratically elected legislature.98 The nebulous executive power, given
judicial recognition in the Tampa case, may be deployed readily against
others when the will of the legislature no longer serves the needs of the
government, and it is considered convenient to do so. This concern is far
from fanciful given the political climate prevailing in the UK and many other
Commonwealth states post September 11 2001. 9' For example, in Refugee
Council of New Zealand Inc v Attorney-General (No 1) the High Court stated
that, "The need for any state to protect its borders, and the central importance
of the prerogative power in doing so, is brought into stark relief by the events
of September 11."1°
The acid test of a liberal democracy is how it treats 'the other', especially in
testing times. In response to rising numbers of asylum claimants, whom
96 See R v Secretary of State for Home Department ex parte JCWI [1996] 4 All E.R.
385, at 401-2, where the right of access to the asylum determination system was
implied from the terms of the Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act 1993. In T v
UK, supra n 93, at 754(b), it was observed that: "Subject only to qualifications
created by statute this country is entirely free to decide as a matter of executive
discretion, which foreigners it allows to remain within its boundaries."
7 149 U.S. 698, 737 (1893).
98 Exparte Fire Brigades Union [1995] 2 AC 513, at 552.
99 Ministers sought to justify the Government's response to the Tampa refugees as
the Federal Court deliberated with reference to the link between the arrival of
refugees on boats and terrorists. See Head, supra n 2, at 30; Crock and Saul supra
n 92, at 38. On the 9/11 phenomenon see Thomas, "September 1 1t ' and Good
Governance (2002) 53 NILQ 366.
l0' [2002] N.Z.A.R. 717 [23]. The case dealt with the legality of detaining all
asylum seekers (including some who had been aboard the MV Tampa) under the
Immigration Act 1987 s 128. The court determined that at common law and
under international law, New Zealand had the right to regulate admission to its
territory.
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Western governments perceive to be vexatious generally,' states have
employed policies of external deterrence. These policies are blunt
instruments affecting all nugrants, including genuine asylum seekers,
indiscriminately. This fact has been recognised at both political0 2 and
judicial levels in the UK:
"The problems facing refugees in their quest for asylum need
little emphasis. Prominent amongst them is the difficulty of
gaining access to a friendly shore. [... ] Although under the
Convention subscribing states must give sanctuary to any
refugee who seeks asylum (subject only to removal to a safe
third country), they are by no means bound to facilitate his
arrival. Rather they strive increasingly to prevent it."'0 3
Interdiction is but one of a number of strategies employed by Western states
to reduce the increasing numbers of asylum seekers arriving. Additionally,
states have imposed visa restrictions on countries generating asylum seekers
and financial sanctions on those carriers bringing migrants into their
territory, where those migrants lack the requisite entry documentation.'
They have also placed immigration and liaison officers at ports overseas to
prevent putative refugees from reaching their intended sanctuary.'0 5
Collectively, these strategies empty the right to seek asylum of its legal, if
not moral, value. Moreover, they insulate states from their commitments
under the Geneva Convention and its Protocol, and other international human
rights treaties.
The decision in Ruddock gives cause for serious concern at an international
and domestic level. Firstly, regarding international refugee protection, the
decision operates as another reminder of the increasingly common practice
of states of barring access to determination procedures. The gulf between
state practice and international treaty norms demonstrates that Western
refugee-receiving states pay lip service to the right to seek asylum and
international human rights standards. The practice of interdiction at sea is
indicative of how states are guarding their legal sovereignty in the field of
immigration and asylum robustly. Where their interests and policies conflict
with international human rights law, national courts have permitted the
101 For an analysis of the deconstruction of refugees by politicians and the media, see
Billings, "Alienating Asylum Seekers: Welfare Support in the Immigration and
Asylum Act 1999" (2002) 9(3) JSSL 115, 116-124.
102 Home Affairs Committee (May 12, 1998) per Mike O'Brien (then Immigration
Minister).
103 See R v Uxbridge Magistrates' Court exparte Adimi [2001] Q.B. 667 at 673-74
per Simon Brown L.J..
See generally, Billings, "A Comparative Analysis of Administrative and
Adjudicative Systems for Determining Asylum Claims" (2000) 52(1) Admin LR
253, and Legomsky, "An Asylum Seeker's Bill of Rights in a Non-Utopian
World" (2000) 14 Geo Immigr LJ 619. Both papers analyse internal and external
strategies for managing the increasing volume of asylum claims utilised in recent
105 years.
For example, the pre-clearance entry controls were introduced at Prague's Ruzyne
airport on July 18 2001, pursuant to Art 7(1) Inunigration (Leave to Enter and
Remain) Order 2000. See European Roma Rights Centre, supra n 95.
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former to trump the latter."0 6 Indeed, the case functions as a microcosm of
the edifice upon which refugee protection is built. The 1951 Convention
represented "a compromise between the exclusive power of the state over entry
into and presence in its territory, the very essence of sovereignty, and the
competing humanitarian impulse to aid strangers in necessitous
circumstances."' 7 On the one hand, states yielded their absolute control over
immigration by agreeing upon formal legal criteria for defining a refugee. On
the other, relinquishing total control over the admittance of non-nationals, by
permitting international law to encroach into, arguably, the most jealously
guarded area of state sovereignty came at a price; notably, the lack of procedural
specification in the Convention or Protocol. 10 8 Increasingly, controlling the
administrative process of determination does not counterbalance the erosion of
state sovereignty that states perceive the Convention to constitute.
Consequently, drastic measures, such as interdiction, have been pursued in
order to appease public opinion in some host states. Moreover, the willingness
of states to undermine applicable human rights standards may encourage and
facilitate coordinated regional responses along similar lines. For coastal
states in southern Europe the attraction of a formalised EU agreement on
interdiction at sea, is self-evident.0 9 Indeed, the European Commission is set
to draw up a formal proposal for the launch of the Border Management
Agency, possibly in 2004. The agency would coordinate monitoring of land,
air and sea borders, especially in the Mediterranean." 0
Second, the constitutional implications are profound. The majority in
Ruddock approved archaic and poorly reasoned precedents to support its
determination. Precedents that were established when the prevailing
ideology was restrictive nationalism and 'classical immigration law' was the
106 This is generally the case in respect of external policies of deterrence such as
interdiction, visa requirements and the use of immigration officials overseas.
However, domestic courts have frequently protected the interests of asylum
seekers once inside the territory of a host state in the face of internal policies that
seek to limit procedural guarantees and the availability of welfare benefits for
example.
107 Fitzpatrick, "Flight From Asylum: Trends Toward Temporary Refuge and Local
Responses to Forced Migrations" (1994) 35 V'bilt JIL 13, 13-14. Also, see
Hathaway, "A Reconsideration of the Underlying Premise of Refugee Law" (1990)
31 Harv Int'l LJ 129, 133.
08 Another reason is that international law generally leaves states free to determine the
manner in which they meet their international obligations. However if a state fails to
fulfil its international obligations adequately then that state's position in international
law becomes affected and may lead to the charge that it is in breach of international
law. See generally, Jennings and Watts, Oppenheim's International Law (Longman,
1997), at 82-86.
109 Indeed, the Italians already interdict Albanian migrants in the Adriatic Sea, and
British and Spanish naval vessels patrol the Straits of Gibraltar. A common policy
on interdiction may be conceived as part of the comprehensive policy of
deflection of unwanted migrants away from a border-free Europe. (See generally,
Noll, Negotiating Asylum. The EU Acquis, Extraterritorial Protection and the
Common Market of Deflection (Martinus Nijhoff, 2000).
110 "EU leaders back creation of border agency in immigration clampdown", Agence
France Press (October 16, 2003).
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legal epiphenomenon of the times."' The decision serves to undermine legal
certainty, an essential element of the rule of law. Furthermore, the majority's
construction of the relationship between statute and executive power was
regressive, indulging the Executive's claim without a judicious examination
of its merits or the relevance of international law. The Executive's
argument, essentially based on communal self-determination, underpinned
by concerns about preserving and protecting national identity, culture, and
social welfare provision in the face of rising numbers of asylum claims, was
legitimate. However, the appropriate forum to air such concerns was
Parliament. The fact that the legislature's approval of the interdiction of the
Tampa was, subsequently, forthcoming, does not disguise the fact that the
Australian Parliament was by-passed over an issue that had been its preserve
for a long time.
In this episode, the Australian government retreated into the safe harbour of
sovereignty whilst leaving asylum seekers at sea. The Federal Court lowered
the veil of obscurity that shrouds the use of such residual discretionary and
arbitrary powers further, by virtue of their deference to the Executive.
Insulating Australia from refugees in its territorial waters by reliance on the
weapon of primitive prerogative powers was wrong legally, and the policy
behind it unethical.
... Schuck, "The Transformation of Immigration Law" (1984) 84(1) Columbia LR 1,
